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THE ROLE OF PARTY AUTONOMY IN 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF SECURED 
CREDITOR’S RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Anna Veneziano 
INTRODUCTION 
The need to provide sound and clear rules regarding the 
enforcement of a secured creditor’s rights upon the debtor’s default is 
expressly recognized in the most recent international instruments 
dealing with secured transactions. Such instruments all contain a well-
developed and specific regulation of enforcement measures, applicable 
(also) outside insolvency proceedings. While additional steps may be 
required to exercise said rights when qualified third parties are involved 
(e.g., perfection requirements), or other rules may have to be applied 
to determine the outcome of conflicts among holders of conflicting 
proprietary interests on the same collateral, the existence of a security 
agreement is generally sufficient to trigger the application of the rules 
on enforcement. 
In this paper, I will look at uniform law texts regarding this 
topic, with a view to assess whether it is possible to detect common 
directions and to understand the reasons for any divergent approach. 
The term ‘uniform law’ is used here to refer to a variety of instruments, 
be they hard law or soft law as well as global or regional. In particular, 
I will focus on three well-known examples that are representative of 
                                                 
 The Author is Professor of Comparative Law at the University of Teramo 
(Italy) and Professor of European Property Law at the University of Amsterdam. She 
is currently serving as Deputy Secretary-General of the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT). The opinions expressed in the present 
paper do not purport to reflect an official position of UNIDROIT. 
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such a variety: (a) the Cape Town Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment1 and its Aircraft Protocol2 (as an 
example of a highly successful3 hard law text with global application 
but in a very specialized sector,4 which creates an autonomous 
international interest recognized and enforceable in contracting 
States);5 (b) the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
                                                 
1   Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 
2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Cape Town Convention]. The text of the 
Convention in English is available at http:// 
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/cape-town-convention. 
2 Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (Nov. 16, 2001), available in 
English at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-main.htm [hereinafter 
Aircraft Protocol] 
3   Until now as many as sixty-nine States around the world have ratified 
or otherwise acceded to the Cape Town Convention, while sixty-one States have 
adhered to the Aircraft Protocol (the Protocol entered into force in 2006). 
UNIDROIT, Status - Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town, 
2001) (December 3, 2015), http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown; 
UNIDROIT, Status – Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment (December 3, 2015), 
http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown-aircraft. The European Union has 
also acceded to the Convention and the Aircraft Protocol as a Regional Economic 
Integration Organization, thus permitting (but not imposing) ratification by Member 
States. See ROY GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE 
EQUIPMENT AND PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO AIRCRAFT 
EQUIPMENT, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY 142 et seq. (3d ed. UNIDROIT, 2013). 
Furthermore, the International Registry for Aircraft Equipment (operated under the 
supervision of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) by Aviareto  has 
reached more than 500,000 entries since its establishment in 2006. SITA, Aircraft 
Equipment Registry Passes Half Million Milestone (Oct. 9, 2014), 
http://www.sita.aero/content/Aircraft-equiment-registry-passes-half-million-
milestone. 
4   Two additional Protocols to the Cape Town Convention, the 2007 
Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock (Rail Protocol) and the 2012 
Protocol on Matters Specific to Space Assets (Space Protocol) were approved but 
have not yet entered into force. 
5   The Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft Protocol were jointly 
approved by UNIDROIT and ICAO on the basis of a project drafted within 
UNIDROIT. See GOODE, supra note 3, at 13 et seq. (describing the nature and purpose 
of the Convention system). 
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Transactions6 (as an example of a policy-oriented soft law instrument 
with global scope of application, primarily addressed to national 
legislators considering a reform of their general domestic secured 
transaction laws);7 (c) Book IX of the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference on a European Private Law (DCFR)8 (as an example of a 
regional soft law instrument on secured transactions in general, 
developed within the DCFR European academic project, which 
creates an autonomous European security right with cross-border 
enforceability).9 
There are other examples of uniform law texts concerning 
secured transactions that emphasize the importance of enforcement 
measures, but they will not be specifically analyzed here.10 
I.  COMMON TRENDS IN THE RULES ON ENFORCEMENT OF 
                                                 
6   U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 
ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.12 (2010) [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide]. 
7   On the nature and purpose of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, see 
Spiradon V. Bazinas, The utility and efficacy of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions, in AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN A TIME 
OF CRISIS 133 et seq. (Orkun Akseli ed., 2012). 
8   Book IX - Proprietary Security in Movable Assets, in PRINCIPLES, 
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON 
FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR), 5389 et seq. (Christian von Bar et al., eds. 2009) 
[hereinafter Book IX DCFR]. Book IX DCFR was prepared by a team led by U. 
Drobnig and was subsequently approved within the DCFR project by the Study 
Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law 
(Acquis Group). 
9   On the nature and purpose of the DCFR, see Introduction, in PRINCIPLES, 
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT COMMON 
FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR), 1 et seq. (Christian von Bar et al., eds. 2009). 
10   For an additional example, see the Model Law on Secured Transactions 
(1994 and 2004) of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), which provides a basic framework for domestic legal reform tailored to 
transition economies: “The Model allows the person taking security to enforce the 
charge immediately after a failure to pay the secured debt. . . It is vital that 
appropriate provisions on enforcement be included. Without a clear right to enforce, 
the charge-holder is deprived of his remedy and a charge becomes valueless.” 
MODEL LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS: PART IV – ENFORCEMENT AND 
TERMINATION, EBRD, at art. 22-30 (1994, 2004) [hereinafter EBRD Model Law].  
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SECURED CREDITORS’ RIGHTS 
Not surprisingly, due to the different nature, purpose, and 
particularly the different scope of application of the international 
instruments that are considered, the legal regime of enforcement that 
they provide cannot be the same. I believe, however, that it is possible 
to find a number of elements that are common and point to a 
convergence in the international approach to the topic. In line with the 
general theme of the International Academy of Commercial and 
Consumer Law (IACCL) conference, the analysis will center on the 
role played by party autonomy and the mechanisms used to control it. 
Thus, I will not offer a systematic description of the respective legal 
regimes of enforcement, but will specifically focus on examples of 
common trends (and any divergences) that relate to the scope of 
parties’ self-regulation and its limitations. 
By way of a more general observation, each of the above-
mentioned texts begins with the assumption that clear and predictable 
rules regarding secured creditors’ enforcement rights are advantageous 
for all parties involved, and that an easy, less costly, and speedy 
implementation of such rights is a key element for a well-functioning 
secured transactions system.11 It may facilitate (cross-border) financing 
with better conditions, since the likelihood of obtaining recovery in 
case of default may well be one of the factors influencing creditor’s 
decisions in this respect. Furthermore, the backdrop of an efficient, 
rapid, and cost-effective system of recovery will also be important to 
shape parties’ willingness to avoid formal insolvency proceedings 
through cooperation by entering into out-of-court arrangements 
                                                 
11   “The availability of adequate and readily enforceable default remedies 
is of crucial importance to the creditor, who must be able to predict with confidence 
its ability to exercise a default remedy expeditiously.” GOODE, supra note 3, at 58. 
Similarly, the efficient enforcement of secured creditors’ rights is listed among the 
key objectives of a modern secured transactions regime in the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide: “A security right will . . . have little value to a secured creditor 
unless it can be enforced effectively and efficiently. A modern secured transactions 
regime will include procedures that precisely describe the rights and obligations of 
grantors and secured creditors upon enforcement.” UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, 
supra note 6, at § 56. The need for speedy and cost-effective enforcement is also the 
underpinning principle of Chapter 7 of Book IX DCFR and its preference towards 
extra-judicial enforcement. Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at 5618. 
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(which are often considered an advantageous alternative, especially in 
the case of cross-border transactions). 
The enhancement of parties’ self-regulation is one of the 
mechanisms that is put into place to achieve the result of ensuring a 
rapid and less costly enforcement of creditors’ rights. Strengthening 
the role of parties’ autonomy is indeed one of the most evident traits 
in all three instruments that are considered here. At the same time, 
there is still the need to find a good balance between party autonomy 
on the one hand, and the protection of various interests, those of the 
debtor but also of third parties, on the other hand. It is in the balance 
of such different interests that the three instruments diverge, which in 
my view (at least partly) is justified in light of the difference in their 
respective scope of application. 
A.         The Enhancement of Party Autonomy and its Role(s) 
Parties’ self-regulation is reinforced by limiting the impact of 
mandatory formal proceedings (such as the need for a court decision 
before enforcement or the imposition of a formal procedure like a 
public sale). Thus, all three instruments favor extra-judicial 
enforcement, which is considered an option that should always be 
available to the creditor12 if agreed upon in the contract or at some 
other point in time,13 or unless otherwise provided by the parties.14 
Moreover, the creditor, if all required conditions are met, can exercise 
a wide array of out-of-court measures, including using the value of the 
collateral other than by selling it and being satisfied with the proceeds 
(e.g., lease the collateral or collect or receive any income of profits 
                                                 
12  See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 283-84, 
recommendation 142. “[I]n order to maximize flexibility in enforcement and thereby 
to obtain the highest possible price upon disposition, creditors should have the 
option of proceeding either judicially or extra judicially when enforcing their security 
rights.” 
13  See Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(1); GOODE, supra note 
3, at 278. For the additional layers of complexity of the Cape Town Convention 
system that derive from the interplay between main Convention, asset-specific 
Protocols, States’ power to issue declarations, and market incentives; see infra p. 10. 
14  See Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art. IX-7:103(1). “Unless otherwise 
agreed, the secured creditor may carry out extra-judicial enforcement of the security 
right”. Chapter 7:217 makes it clear that the creditor retains the option to make 
recourse to judicial enforcement. 
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arising from the management of the encumbered asset).15 
Furthermore, even within court proceedings there is a preference for 
speedy relief measures,16 though this point is not emphasized in the 
same way in each text due to their different nature and scope of 
application.17 Therefore, there is a degree of uniformity at least in the 
general approach chosen by all three instruments. 
If we turn from the general to the particular, however, we must 
take a series of additional factors into account. We will focus here on 
some factors that show that the role played by party autonomy is more 
complex than may appear at first sight. 
The first important element to be considered is that a decision 
on the default rule (i.e., the rule applicable “unless otherwise agreed”) 
may change the purpose of allowing a contrary agreement between the 
parties. Book IX DCFR can be used as a good example in this respect, 
since party autonomy is present in several provisions but does not 
always play the same role. The principle underlying the whole Chapter 
on enforcement is that its rules are mandatory, unless otherwise 
provided within the text.18 Several provisions allow for an express 
derogation by the parties, but said derogation fulfills different 
purposes. For instance, as mentioned above, the commercial creditor 
may generally exercise extra-judicial enforcement, unless exclusive 
                                                 
15  Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(1); UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 312, recommendation 141; Book IX DCFR, supra 
note 8, at Art. IX-7:207. 
16  See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 311, 
recommendation 138. The possibility to obtain, in particular, advance speedy relief by 
courts pending final determination of a dispute is one of the cornerstones of the 
Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol’s enforcement system, as provided in 
Art. 13 Convention and Art. X Protocol. See supra, Cape Town Convention, note 1, 
and Aircraft Protocol, supra note 2.  
17   In particular, Chapter 7 of Book IX DCFR expressly focuses on extra-
judicial enforcement, leaving court enforcement proceedings to national law. See Book 
IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Cmt. A to Art.IX-7:101. Thus, Book IX does not attempt 
to lay down rules for judicial enforcement. It does, however, stress the need for an 
expeditious court decision on a recourse against an enforcement measure or against 
resistance to an enforcement measure. Id. at 7:104. The same approach regarding 
judicial supervision of enforcement when a conflict arises is found in the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 280, 
§ 19, and recommendation 137. 
18   Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art.IX-7:102. 
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recourse to a court or other competent authority is agreed in the 
contract.19 On the other hand, a private sale by the creditor is only 
admitted if parties stipulate otherwise (or if a published market price 
for the collateral exists).20 
In these two examples, party autonomy serves divergent 
purposes. In the first case, a higher degree of formality in the 
proceedings may be imposed by modifying the default rule; in the 
second instance, the contrary agreement allows the creditor to exercise 
an additional remedy.21 Failing such an agreement, the default rule does 
not allow that particular remedy (or it does so only if specific 
requirements are met). It must be pointed out that bargaining to 
exclude a default rule presupposes that the debtor be in a position to 
accept, or reject, the contrary agreement. The situation is clearly 
different where the instrument applies in a highly specialized and 
professionalized market (as in the case of aircraft financing, for 
example) or more generally (thus, in Book IX DCFR consumers are 
always entitled to court proceedings, unless they agree to extra-judicial 
enforcement after default, and are subject to additional safeguards, see 
Section III, infra). 
Another element that should be mentioned is the degree of 
formality that is required of the “contrary agreement” between the 
parties. For example, parties’ agreement on the exercise of extra-
judicial remedies under the Cape Town Convention need not be in 
writing, nor should it refer specifically to the Convention’s provisions 
or specific remedies.22 On the other hand, a pre-default agreement on 
appropriation of encumbered assets by the creditor under Article IX.-
7:105 DCFR will need to be more formal since parties are obliged to 
indicate a method which allows for a ready determination of a 
reasonable market price. Failing such an indication, the agreement is 
                                                 
19   Id. at Art.IX-7:103(1). 
20   See id. at Art.IX-7:211(2). 
21   In particular, when a published market price for the collateral exists, see 
id. at Art. IX-7:211(2). 
22   GOODE, supra note 3, at 280 (“an agreement in general terms, for 
example, ‘all remedies under the Convention,’ suffices. . . . [S]uch terms would cover 
remedies under the Protocol as well as under the Convention.”). 
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void, unless the collateral is a fungible asset that is traded on a 
recognized market with published prices.23 
The different nature of the instrument gives rise to interesting 
additional layers of complexity in the case of the Cape Town 
Convention system, that is, a multilateral treaty approved in a 
diplomatic Conference24 with participation of States’ representatives 
and later subject to ratification by States. Following a widely used 
technique, in order to reach international consensus within the formal 
setting of the diplomatic Conference, the possibility for contracting 
States to opt out of specified provisions through a declaration25 was 
introduced. With particular regard to enforcement, according to the 
main Convention contracting States must make a declaration for or 
against extra-judicial enforcement as default rule,26 and may make 
additional declarations in relation to the applicability of specific 
enforcement measures.27 
This balance was already modified by the Aircraft Protocol28 
where some of the Convention rules on enforcement were displaced, 
                                                 
23   Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art.IX.-7:105(1) and (2). 
24   Or better said, diplomatic Conferences, since the Aircraft Protocol was 
approved together with the main Convention in Cape Town in 2001 whilst the other 
two Protocols, Rail and Space, were separately approved, respectively, in 
Luxembourg in 2007 and in Berlin in 2012. 
25   The Cape Town Convention does not contain the classical 
“reservations,” but introduced “declarations” that allow for more flexibility and 
choices regarding their content. See generally ROY GOODE, HERBERT KRONKE, EWAN 
MCKENDRICK, TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW  418-419 (2d ed. 2015). 
26   Article 54(2) requires a contracting State to declare whether or not any 
remedy, which under the Convention does not require application to the court, is to 
be exercisable only with leave of the court. It is a mandatory declaration.. Cape Town 
Convention, supra note 1, at art. 54(2).  
27   For example, lease of collateral is permitted unless a contracting State 
declared that the charge (debtor) shall not grant a lease of the object while it is 
situated within or controlled from that State’s territory. Id. at art. 8(1)(b), 54(1). 
28   For the enforcement provisions in the Rail and Space Protocols, see 
ROY GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE 
EQUIPMENT AND LUXEMBOURG PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO 
RAILWAY ROLLING STOCK, OFFICIAL COMMENTARY 71 et seq. (2d ed., UNIDROIT, 
2014); ROY GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE 
EQUIPMENT AND PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO SPACE ASSETS, 
OFFICIAL COMMENTARY 189 et seq. (UNIDROIT, 2013). 
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additional specific remedies were introduced (in particular, 
deregistration and export and physical transfer of the aircraft object 
from the territory where it is situated) and a mechanism of opting in 
specific provisions was chosen.29 The modification went in the 
direction of allowing increased predictability and a greater scope for 
parties’ self-regulation both outside and within court proceedings. 
The evolution of the system, however, did not stop with the 
approval of the treaties but was further influenced by the relevant 
credit market. Under the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Aircraft Sector Understanding,30 a reduced 
fee or interest rate for export credit may be applied if a contracting 
State to both the Convention and the Aircraft Protocol has made so-
called “qualifying declarations,” among which the declarations with 
respect to enforcement measures are counted. In particular, a State 
may qualify if it either adheres to the default provision on extra-judicial 
enforcement or it opts in to the Aircraft Protocol rules regarding 
advance relief measures during court proceedings. This development 
shows that, when a uniform law text applies to a specialized, highly 
sophisticated, and integrated market and has the potential to trigger 
economic benefits for both creditors and debtors, subsequent market 
incentives may indirectly influence contracting States’ decisions and as 
a consequence the international regulation in the field. 
B.         A Shift from Traditional Control Mechanisms to Ex-Post 
Evaluation and Transparency Rules  
As noted earlier, while all three instruments considered give 
more weight to party autonomy, rules protecting the debtor and/or 
other parties are not abandoned. The tendency, however, is to reduce 
the impact of certain traditional remedies that are perceived to be 
inefficient or unnecessary. The shift towards out-of-court enforcement 
as opposed to mandatory formal proceedings was already mentioned. 
Additionally, control mechanisms that work ex ante through the 
                                                 
29   For a detailed overview of the enforcement provisions in the Aircraft 
Protocol and their relation to the main Convention, see GOODE, supra note 3, at 447 
et seq. 
30   Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
Aircraft Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft, 
TAD/ASU(2011)1 (Aug. 31, 2011). 
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sanction of invalidity of parties’ agreement are restricted in their 
application. This is true, for example, if we look at the well-known 
prohibition of pactum commissorium (typically found in civil law 
jurisdictions).31 Such a development is hardly surprising in light of the 
fact that even the most traditionally oriented national laws in this 
respect show a clear tendency to move away from a strict interpretation 
of this requirement, and this appears not only in very specialized areas, 
such as financial collateral,32 but even generally.33 
It is probably more relevant to see how the need to balance 
competing interests (with particular regard to interests of third parties) 
is pursued through alternative and more modern means. The 
mechanisms that can be found in all three instruments are fourfold: (1) 
reliance on parties’ agreement (as noted above, the exercise of specific 
remedies may be subject to the contract expressly allowing them and 
sometimes to additional limitations and conditions); (2) use of ex-post 
evaluation of the exercise of all enforcement rights; (3) transparency 
provisions introducing information duties; and (4) upholding of the 
traditional principle of avoiding creditor’s enrichment. 
As to the shift to ex-post evaluation, all three instruments 
expressly refer to the parameter of ‘commercial reasonableness’ (or 
other general standard) to achieve a fair realization value when self-
help measures are executed. The Cape Town Convention states that 
                                                 
31   See Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art. IX.-7:105, according to which 
a pre-default agreement on appropriation of encumbered assets is void, unless the 
encumbered asset is a fungible asset that has a published price or parties agree in 
advance on some method to ensure objectivity of evaluation. For a brief justification 
of this rule, see Book IX, supra note 8, at 5622. According to the Cape Town 
Convention, however, an agreement whereby ownership is vested in the creditor 
cannot be made in advance of default, but only after default and at the conditions set 
forth in Article 9 Convention. GOODE, supra note 3, at 283. Article 11 Convention, 
however, leaves the parties free to determine what constitutes “default” under their 
agreement. Those rules do not apply to retention of title devices. See infra at section 
II(C). 
32   For E.U. member States, this results from the implementation of the 
Financial Collateral Directive. See Council Directive 2002/47, 2002 OJ (L 168) 43 
(EC) as amended by Council Directive 2009/44, art. 4, 2009 OJ (L 146) 37 (EC).   
33   See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2348 (Fr.) as modified by the 2006 French 
secured transactions’ law reform, which considers such agreements valid. For 
commentary, see LAURENT AYNES & PIERRE CROCQ, DROIT CIVIL: LES SURETES, LA 
PUBLICITE FONCIERE 239 et seq. (4th ed. 2009).  
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any out-of-court remedy of a secured creditor “shall be exercised in a 
commercially reasonable manner.”34 The UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide recommends that national legislators “provide that a person 
must enforce its rights and perform its obligations under the 
provisions on enforcement in good faith and in a commercially 
reasonable manner.”35 According to Article IX.–7:103(4) DCFR, 
“enforcement must be undertaken by the secured creditor in a 
commercially reasonable way.” Once again, however, the different role 
played by party autonomy bears an influence on how the same 
principle is concretely applied. Thus, according to the Cape Town 
Convention, a remedy exercised in conformity with the security 
agreement will be deemed commercially reasonable unless the 
contractual provision is “manifestly unreasonable.” The benchmark 
for the standard of conduct is therefore parties’ self-regulation, 
interpreted against the background of international practice.36 On the 
other hand, according to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, the 
recommended general standard of conduct should be mandatory and 
not subject to unilateral waiver or contrary agreement at any time,37 
while Book IX DCFR puts more emphasis on good faith by requiring 
that creditors exercise enforcement measures, as far as possible, in 
cooperation with the security provider and any third party. 
With regard to transparency, there is a tendency to introduce 
information duties of the secured creditor toward the debtor and 
specific third parties (particularly, other secured creditors).38 It should 
                                                 
34   Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(3). 
35   UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 310. 
36   “The phrase ‘manifestly unreasonable’ is a signal to courts that they 
should not lightly disturb the bargain made by the parties. Established commercial 
practice is relevant to whether a provision in a security agreement is ‘manifestly 
unreasonable’. A provision that is in line with accepted international practice will 
normally be regarded as not manifestly unreasonable”: GOODE, supra note 3, at 280. 
37   UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 311. 
38   See e.g., Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8(4) (reasonable 
prior notice in writing to specified interested persons); UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide, supra note 6, at recommendation 149 (on the creditor’s duty to give notice of 
its intention to exercise extra-judicial sale, granting of lease or license or other 
disposal of the collateral); Book IX DCFR, supra note 8 at Arts. IX.–7:208 to 7:210 
(notices of extra-judicial disposition). A brief overview of the rules on notices in 
Book IX is provided in Comment A to Art. IX.–7:107. Book IX DCFR, supra note 
8, cmt. A to Art. IX.-7:107.  
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be noted that the cost-effectiveness of such rules will depend on the 
degree of the formalities that are imposed for the notice.39 In this 
respect, the Cape Town Convention’s language (“reasonable prior 
notice in writing”) is less exacting than the regime suggested in the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide or envisaged in Book IX DCFR, both 
of which impose more precise time, content, and language 
constraints.40 
Another element worth considering is that the functionality of 
the notice system is strictly related to the existence of a public 
electronic registry based on a notice-filing approach (according to 
which a statement containing select information as to creditor, debtor 
and collateral should be filed in a publicly accessible registry for the 
purpose of ensuring that the security right is effective as against other 
secured creditors, execution creditors, and the administrator of 
debtor’s insolvency). Such a general policy choice is made in all three 
instruments41 and permits a clearer identification of the most relevant 
third parties to which the notice should be given.42 
Another protection mechanism is the avoidance of 
enrichment. The question is whether, should there be any surplus from 
the sale or alternative use of the value of the collateral, it should return 
to (other lower ranking creditors and finally to) the debtor. All three 
instruments clearly retain this solution.43 A different regime is 
introduced, however, for those transactions that are based on retention 
                                                 
39   “The law should provide rules ensuring that the notice . . . can be given 
in an efficient, timely and reliable way so as to protect the grantor or other interested 
parties, while, at the same time, avoiding having a negative effect on the secured 
creditor’s remedies and the potential net realization value of the encumbered assets.” 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at recommendation 150.  
40   See id. at recommendation 151(b); Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at Art. 
IX.–7:210. 
41   Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at Chapter IV; UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 110 et seq.; Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at ch. 3. 
42   Interestingly, the EBRD Model Law provides that the enforcement 
notice to the debtor (which has to contain specific information) must be registered 
in the Charges Registry as supplementary information to be effective. See EBRD 
Model Law, supra note 10, at arts. 22.2, 22.4, and 33. 
43   See Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 8(5) and (6); 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at recommendation 152 (distribution of 
proceeds of disposition of an encumbered asset); Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at 
Art. IX.–7:215 (distribution of proceeds of extra-judicial enforcement). 
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of title instead of consisting in the creation of a limited security right 
or the transfer of collateral by way of security, which topic will be now 
discussed. 
C.         A Differentiated Regime for Enforcement of Retention of 
Title Devices 
In all the international instruments considered, the policy 
decision was taken to include within their general scope of application 
not only security rights on movables granted by the debtor to the 
creditor, but also transactions where title to the collateral is retained by 
the financier (e.g., a conditional sale or a leasing agreement). In 
principle, such transactions are subject to the same basic legal 
framework that governs the more traditional limited rights in rem.44 In 
relation to a few specific issues, however, different rules (may) apply. 
An exception shared by all three instruments is found in 
enforcement. The creditor (seller or lessor) is not accountable for any 
surplus and may terminate the agreement upon debtor’s default and 
take possession or control of the collateral as a full owner, without 
being subject to all conditions and limits that are envisaged for a 
secured creditor in general45 
                                                 
44   For the Cape Town Convention, see GOODE, supra note 3, at 267 
(“Most of the . . . provisions of the Convention apply to all three forms of agreement 
[security agreement, conditional sale and lease].”). The UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide recommends an integrated scheme, giving national legislators the option 
between a unitary and non-unitary approach to acquisition financing. UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide, supra note 6, 57 et seq., § 111 et seq. Even under the latter 
approach, however, most of the rules applicable to security rights are extended to 
retention of title devices. Finally, see Art. IX. – 1:104 DCFR and Comment A, Book 
IX DCFR, supra note 8, at 5401 (“the regime of retention of ownership devices, while 
partly autonomous, is in most respects identical with that for security rights.”). 
45   See Cape Town Convention, supra note 1, at art. 10; See also Art. IX.-
7:301 DCFR. Concerning the Cape Town Convention, it must be noted that the 
qualification of an agreement as “retention of title” or “lease” for the purposes of 
Article 10 is left to the applicable domestic law, so that in those legal systems where 
such devices (or specific types of such devices) are qualified as security rights Article 
10 would not apply. GOODE, supra note 3, at 267 et seq. The UNCITRAL Legislative 
Guide, on the other hand, suggests that acquisition finance devices (a functional 
category including retention of title devices) be subject to the same regime that is 
applied to non-acquisition finance devices, but allows for deviations “to the extent 
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It is interesting to note that this specific derogation from the 
general rules is not justified on the basis of the economic function of 
the device as acquisition financing tool (otherwise it would apply to all 
agreements pursuing the same function regardless of which party holds 
title in the collateral).46 It expressly relies on the formal structure of the 
agreement.47 While this solution may have had the purpose of making 
the inclusion of retention of title less objectionable in the eyes of 
European jurists and/or governmental representatives, it raises doubts 
as to whether the justification for a different treatment based on the 
formal structure of the transaction only is sufficiently well founded. 
This all the more so because recent reforms in national secured 
transaction laws opted for the application of a functional approach in 
this respect.48 
II.         CONSUMER PROTECTION AND PARTY AUTONOMY 
Another interesting issue with regard to the role of party 
autonomy in the enforcement of creditor’s rights arises when one of 
                                                 
necessary to preserve the coherence of the regime applicable to sale and lease” 
(UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, 380-381, recommendation 200).  
46   Which is what is envisaged for another important exception to the 
general rules contained in both the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and in Book IX 
DCFR is the special priority (so-called “super-priority”) as against previously 
registered security rights on the same collateral, granted to all acquisition finance 
devices regardless of their formal structure. See UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra 
note 6, at 377, recommendations 187-188; Art. IX. – 4:102 DCFR. 
47   For the Cape Town Convention, see GOODE, supra note 3, at 66 (“The 
provisions are much simpler because in contrast with the chargee, who has merely a 
security interest, the conditional seller or lessor retains full rights in the equipment.”). 
See also Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, at 5664, cmt. A to Art. IX. – 7:301 DCFR 
(“The chief reason why the special features of retention of ownership become 
relevant in this area is that, since the seller, supplier or lessor as secured creditor had 
retained ownership, it had remained the owner of the supplied assets.”). A more 
thorough treatment of this issue is found in the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra 
note 6, at 367 et seq., §§ 188-196, where the respective merits of a unitary and non-
unitary approach to retention of title devices , as well as the need to preserve a 
functionally integrated approach whichever choice is made are discussed with 
specific regard to enforcement. 
48   For the 2013 reform in Belgium, see ERIC DIRIX, LA RÉFORME DES 
SÛRETÉS RÉELLES MOBILIÈRES 11 et seq. (2013) (in relation to both sales with 
retention of title and leasing). See also CODE CIVIL [C. CIV] art. 2371(2) (Fr.); AYNÈS 
& CROCQ, supra note 31, at 375 et seq.  
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the parties is a consumer, or is more generally qualified as a “weaker” 
party entitled to a stronger protection. The question is here to what 
extent general rules favorable to a wider application of parties’ self-
regulation should be modified to take this situation into account. It 
must be pointed out that for two of the instruments that we considered 
this question is either irrelevant or has only marginal importance. It 
goes without saying that the scope of application of the Cape Town 
Convention implies a high level of sophistication of all professional 
parties involved. As to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, although it 
includes many forms of consumer transaction, it is not intended to 
override consumer-protection laws or to elaborate consumer-
protection policies, and defers to national law on this matter.49 
On the other hand, the scope of application of Book IX DCFR 
is not limited to professional parties but extends to consumers. In this 
regard, however, the drafters expressly downplayed the importance of 
specific consumer protection in the field of secured transactions as 
opposed to that of personal security. In fact, there are only a few 
special rules on consumers in the whole Book.50 If we look at 
enforcement, the most interesting aspect is that parties’ autonomy is 
not entirely excluded but still plays a relevant role. Thus, a security right 
over an asset of a consumer can only be enforced by a court or another 
competent authority, but after default the consumer security provider 
can agree to extra-judicial enforcement.51 Further, a pre-default 
agreement on appropriation would be void even if the parties agreed 
in advance on an objective evaluation method, but it is still possible 
when the encumbered asset is a fungible asset traded on a recognized 
market with published prices.52 All other rules of the Chapter apply to 
                                                 
49   “To the extent that a rule of the regime envisaged in the Guide conflicts 
with consumer protection law, the Guide defers to consumer protection law. States 
that do not have a body of law for the protection of consumers may wish to consider 
whether the enactment of a law based on the recommendations of the Guide would 
affect the rights of consumers and would thus require the introduction of consumer 
protection legislation.” UNCITRAL Legislative Guide, supra note 6, at 34, § 11. See 
also id. at recommendation 2(b). 
50   See Book IX DCFR, supra note 8, Comments to Art. IX.–2:107. 
51   Id. at Art. IX.–7:103(2). 
52   Id. at Art. IX.–7:105 (1)-(3). 
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consumers with no differentiation, except for a more stringent 
provision on advance notice of enforcement.53 
 CONCLUSIONS 
When looking at the above-mentioned general common 
tendencies in uniform law as regards enforcement measures, one 
should consider that the rules on enforcement contained in 
international instruments are embedded in a more general unitary 
architecture that simplifies and rationalizes the entire regulation of 
secured transactions. In other words, in each of the three examples 
such rules form part of a coherent reform strategy that strives towards 
both greater clarity and efficiency. The trend towards a simplification 
and rationalization of enforcement proceedings for security rights is, 
however, convincing in its own right, also independently of a more 
general reform of secured transactions law, and should be welcomed. 
A look at the most recent legislative interventions in Europe seems to 
confirm that the availability of a more predictable system, and less 
costly and swifter extra-judicial enforcement measures as well as of 
alternative mechanisms for the creditor to realize the value of the 
collateral is perceived as an important element of any well-functioning 
secured transactions regime, however structured. 
But consider that the effectiveness on any enforcement 
measure in a given jurisdiction should be strongly linked to the rules 
of general procedural law and the administration of justice. It may also 
be connected to the role played by, and the effect given to, extra-
judicial settlements and/or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
It would not be realistic, nor even appropriate, to try to reach full 
harmonization through an instrument concerning secured 
transactions. I would surmise that the more specialized and 
circumscribed the regulation, the easier it is to accept rules that 
introduce changes not only to enforcement proceedings in general, but 
also to judicial proceedings (such as advance relief remedies for the 
creditor) in particular, provided that a cost-benefit analysis gives a 
positive result. In devising a general regime with wider application, the 
approach should be more cautious (as shown by the different solutions 
that are found in the examples of Cape Town Convention and Aircraft 
                                                 
53   Id. at Art. IX.–7:107. 
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Protocol on the one hand, and the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and 
Book IX DCFR on the other hand). 
Furthermore, I believe that more thought should be given to 
the question of how to treat retention of title devices in enforcement, 
and especially as to whether a differentiated regime would be 
appropriate. If retention of title devices were to be included in an 
instrument on secured transactions, a differentiated treatment solely 
on the basis of the formal structure of the agreement would not, in my 
opinion, be sufficiently justified. 
I would finally suggest that the question of whether, and to 
what extent, consumer transactions should be subject to a special 
regime, as regards enforcement, deserves thorough consideration. 
 
